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Abstract
Rationale, aims and objectives Chronic disorders of consciousness (CDoC) pose
significant problems of understanding for both medical professionals and the relatives
and friends of the patient. This paper explores the tensions between the different interpre-
tative resources that are drawn upon by lay people and professionals in their response to
CDoC.
Methods A philosophical analysis of data from 51 interviews with people who have
relatives who are (or have been) in a vegetative or minimally conscious state.
Results The medical specialist and the lay person tend to draw on two different interpre-
tative frameworks: a medical science framework, which tends to construct the patient in
terms of measurable physical parameters, and an interpretative framework that encom-
passes the uniqueness of the patient and the relative’s relationship to them as a social
being.
Conclusions These differences potentially lead to ruptures in communication between
medical professionals and relatives such that that an increased self-consciousness of the
framing assumptions being made will facilitate communication and enrich understanding
of CDoCs.
Introduction
Chronic disorders of consciousness, such as coma, persistent/
permanent vegetative states (PVS) [1] or unresponsive wakeful-
ness syndrome [2], and the minimally conscious state (MCS) [3],
pose profound problems of interpretation for lay people and
medical professionals alike. For the lay person, such as the rela-
tive or friend of the patient, a chronic disorder of consciousness
(CDoC) seems to defy many of the categorical distinctions
through which sense is routinely made of everyday experience. A
patient in a vegetative state seems to be neither unambiguously
alive nor dead [4], and one in a MCS may seem neither conscious
nor unconscious, neither an agent nor a passive object. The very
continuity between who the patient is now and who they were
prior to the onset of the condition can be profoundly enigmatic.
Fundamental to this is the problem of how one can gain an insight
into the state of consciousness of the patient merely from obser-
vation of their physical movements – the flicker of an eyelid, gaze,
thrashing or kicking. The diagnosis and prognosis of CDoC
remains complex and problematic, despite the introduction of
technically advanced diagnostic tools such as brain imaging tech-
niques [5]. Given the confusion potentially experienced by rela-
tives and a degree of uncertainty inherent in medical science,
diagnosis and prognosis can be sites of significant conflict and
misunderstanding.
This paper will explore the tensions between the different inter-
pretative resources that are drawn upon by lay people and profes-
sionals in their response to CDoC. It will be suggested that the lay
person and the medical specialist, while confronted by a common
problem of interpreting the inherently equivocal physical move-
ments of the patient, tend to draw on two different interpretative
frameworks that shape (and are shaped by) fundamentally differ-
ent approaches to the problem. It will be suggested that the
medical science, upon which the professional draws, tends to
construct the patient in terms of measurable physical parameters
that have statistically predictable consequences. In contrast, the
relative requires an interpretative framework that will encompass
the uniqueness of the patient and their relationship to them, and
thus a framework that constitutes the patient as a continuing
member of a community – as a social being. While it cannot be
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argued that the interpretations and judgements of medical profes-
sionals are wholly determined by the scientific frameworks –
indeed it must be acknowledged that many strive to adopt the
family’s perspective – it will be suggested that there is a tension
between a scientific or biomedical model of CDoC and a social
and relational experience. The argument is not that one or the other
of these frameworks is false. Rather, that they are complementary.
Nonetheless, a failure to recognize this interpretative tension and
complementarity may serve to inhibit both dialogue between rela-
tive and physician, and the medical professional’s own articulation
of the patient’s condition, and this in turn inhibits an understand-
ing of what the goals of medical care should be.
The paper draws upon a database of interviews with the relatives
of patients who are (or have been) in a vegetative state (VS) and a
MCS. This research has been carried out by sociologists at the
Universities of York and Cardiff, led by Celia Kitzinger and Jenny
Kitzinger, whose own sister, Polly, was severely brain injured and
was in a VS and then MCS for some time, although she subse-
quently emerged into full consciousness, with profound and multi-
ple mental and physical disabilities [6]. Beginning in November
2010, 51 participants, all of whom currently or in the recent past
had relatives in VS or MCS, were interviewed, typically on a
one-to-one basis. The majority of interviews lasted between 2 and
4 hours (with breaks). Uniform structures were not imposed upon
the interviews, thereby allowing participants to tell their stories in
their own ways. The transcribed, and rigorously anonymized,
interviews were analysed in order to identify thematic patterns [7].
Defining PVS
The term ‘persistent vegetative state’ was originally proposed by
Jennett and Plum to label a state of ‘wakefulness without aware-
ness’ [8]. It is ‘a complex neurological condition in which patients
appear to be awake but show no sign of awareness of themselves or
their environment’ [1], or as one interviewee (a brother of a patient
in PVS) puts it: ‘basically your body is working on autopilot, it
breathes, it farts, it feeds but it consciously can’t do any of it’. A
coma patient will not manifest the sleeping–waking cycle of the
patient in VS, while the patient in MCS will manifest fluctuating
degrees of awareness of their self and their environment, for
example by responding to stimuli [9].
It is the ambiguity of CDoCs, in which states that are usually
conjoined – wakefulness and awareness – are in fact separated,
that disrupts the possibility of both coherent lay and medical
understanding of the condition and its consequences. As a mother
of a patient in PVS expresses this:
I never in my wildest imagination – I’d never seen anything
like this, you know. And I don’t think most people have seen
anything like that. It’s not something that you’d, you know,
come across beforehand. Disability, yeah. But as far as I’m
concerned, this isn’t a disability. It’s a devastation.
This suggests that the incomprehensibility of the situation adds a
particular dimension to the relatives’ distress. The cultural
resources through which one routinely makes sense of experi-
ences, and through which one therefore knows how to go on,
practically, living a coherent social life, are found wanting. It is
not merely that there are no obvious categories by which to
organize one’s experience, but also no socially recognizable rites
or practices (akin to baptisms and funerals) through which one
may negotiate the transition to this new state. This failure lies,
in part, in the categories through which meaningful experience
is constituted, such as life and death or consciousness and
unconsciousness.
Understanding the patient
Medical diagnosis may not help to relieve the senselessness
experienced by the relative. That is to say that diagnosis may not
offer a suitable categorical framework within which the condition
and its consequences may be understood. While the various dis-
orders of consciousness may be defined readily enough, diagnosis
itself remains highly problematic, with surveys having suggested
that some 40% of patients may have been misdiagnosed as being
in PVS when actually in MCS [10].
Inaccurate diagnosis may be attributed to a number of factors,
including the low incidence of the condition, and thus the physi-
cians’ unfamiliarity with it, the lack of systematic training in the
use of diagnostic tools and even variation in the tools themselves
[1]. Newer diagnostic tools, such as the Coma Recovery Scale –
Revised (CRS-R) [11] tend to be more sensitive than the older
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) to differences between PVS and
MCS, thus helping to improve diagnosis. The root problem may
nonetheless be understood in terms of the gap that the conditions
open up between physical movement and intentionality. PVS turns
the abstract philosophical problem of other minds – which is to
say, how do we know that the physical bodies that we encounter
around us bear minds or consciousnesses like our own – into a
pressing practical problem. As competent social agents, we have
rich, if tacitly understood, skills in interpreting the behaviour of
others, and in distinguishing intentional from unintentional ges-
tures. Consider seeing someone wink, and consider the sort of
considerations one uses in order to understand that it is an inten-
tional and meaningful gesture – such as an expression of collusion
and complicity – as opposed to being a mere tick. One will draw
upon knowledge of the personality of the person winking, and on
social and physical contexts in which the behaviour occurs, rec-
ognizing, for example, that you and the one who winks have
something to be in collusion about, you are not strangers to each
other, and that it is the sort of situation in which a wink is appro-
priate because, say, you are required to be silent or you are pro-
tecting a playful conspiracy from a third party [12]. Crucially,
human actions, be they mere physical behaviours or complex
verbal expressions, are not inherently meaningful. They make
sense because they allow an interpreter to recognize or construct
often subtle references to context. They are indexical.
Patients in VS and MCS do not offer movements that yield
themselves to ready interpretation. Relatives are well aware of the
problems and dangers of interpreting their relative’s movements.
Thus, the wife of a patient comments that: ‘He’ll grip things, but
it’s very difficult to know if these are conscious decisions or if he’s
just you know, like a baby, his grasp reflex, it’s hard to know’, or
again a mother notes that, as her son came out of a medically
induced coma, ‘we started to do what all relatives do in these
circumstances, you look at every involuntary twitch, every sigh,
every flutter of the eyelids and you think that means something’.
The problem may be understood, firstly, in that the sleeping–
waking cycle, that for most people is indicative of a complex
awareness of one’s environment, cannot be so interpreted for the
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patient in PVS – that is precisely the nature of the condition, with
wakefulness being sundered from awareness. Further, the context
within which the patient acts, and to which they might be inten-
tionally reacting, is typically impoverished compared with that
encountered in everyday interaction. The interpreter, be it the
physician or the relative, may perceive the context simply in terms
of isolated and quite simple stimuli – the sound of a voice, the
touch of a hand and pressure of fingers. Further, the affect that the
condition has upon the patient’s personality, and thus the continu-
ation of personality traits, is highly uncertain – not least because
the recognition of continuity in personality depends precisely
upon the capacity to make clearly indexical expressions that has
been undermined by the condition. The possibility of meaningful
expression is thus distorted and curtailed. Spasticity, along with
medical treatments such as a tracheotomy, or indeed physical
impairments such as deafness, blindness and paralysis, may
significantly inhibit the patient’s ability to express themselves.
Finally, but importantly, awareness and the expression of aware-
ness in MCS is fluctuating, making the diagnostic distinction
between VS and MCS difficult and contestable. Patients in VS
may have a single, isolated moment of lucidity among months or
years of apparent unresponsiveness.
Two types of instruments have been developed to tackle this
problem: behavioural tools and brain imaging. Behavioural tools,
such as the GCS, the Sensory Modality Assessment Technique
(SMART), the CRS-R and the Wessex Head Injury Matrix, typi-
cally serve to systematize the observation of the patient’s
responses and movements, and the interpretations that can be
made of them (see [3] for an overview of these tools). As such,
they may be understood as a systematic reconstruction of the sort
of observational techniques that the lay person, and indeed the
expert physician, might use in trying to elicit evidence of aware-
ness. CRS-R, for example, requires repeated observation of the
patient, with their behaviour recorded on six dimensions: auditory,
visual, motor, oromotor/verbal functions, communication and
arousal, with each dimension scored in terms of the presence or
absence of responses to specific sensory stimuli (Brainstem reflex
is also recorded, but not scored) [3,11]. CRS-R is specifically
designed to distinguish between patients in PVS and in MCS.
SMART similarly requires observation of responses to standard-
ized sensory stimulation, focusing on vision, hearing, taste, touch
and smell, and seeks to bypass problems created by such physical
incapacities as the blindness or deafness of the patient, and sig-
nificantly involves relatives, friends and lay and professional
carers in the assessment process [13].
No tool can directly access the patient’s consciousness or quan-
tify the degree of awareness. Tools, rather, are designed to close
the gap between the observable behaviour of the patient and their
inner mental state, specifically by simplifying the context within
which gestures are interpreted, and thus ascertaining whether
physical movements are indeed indexical gestures. Evidence of
awareness and intentionality is detected by re-establishing the link
between movements and contexts. However, contexts are now
primarily the simple, isolated and readily observable stimuli pro-
vided by the tester, not the complex and often ambiguous contexts
with which competent social agents engage. The physical move-
ment of the patient can then be interpreted, with a minimal degree
of ambiguity or contestability, as a response to a given stimulus (or
as a failure to respond). The patient becomes, as it were, a black
box, assessed in terms of a quasi-causal link between stimulus and
response, and not as a competent social actor.
Observational tools work by recreating a highly stylized
version of the routine social competences through which we
interpret behaviour as meaningful. This may be justified, in part,
on the assumption that the patients themselves, because of their
condition, lack the competence any longer to engage with com-
plex contexts. Thus, such tools refine and systematize observa-
tion, stripping away, as it were, some of the noise that inhibits
interpretation.
It might be suggested that brain imaging, through such tech-
niques as electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission
tomography or functional magnetic resonance imaging, offers an
opening of sorts into the black box. While debates remain about
the degree to which such imag(in)ing serves to improve diagnosis
and prognosis (see [1] ), it is perhaps most significant in seemingly
allowing the diagnostician to bypass the patient’s physical limita-
tions. While the physical behaviour of the patient may be compro-
mised, inhibiting communication and expression, imaging turns to
the even more alien behaviour of the brain – as represented by the
various imaging techniques – and again seeks a way of ascribing
meaning to it. Research by Monti et al. sought to test whether
certain patients diagnosed as being in PVS were responding to
verbal commands, such as to imagine that one is playing tennis, by
identifying similarities between imaged brain activity in the
patients and in healthy control subjects [9]. Demonstrating that
patients diagnosed as being in PVS may nonetheless have aware-
ness, albeit not physically expressed, indicates that the absence of
(behavioural) evidence of awareness does not necessarily entail
evidence of absence of awareness.
Some relatives of patients in VS and MCS express a certain
ambivalence towards behavioural tools and brain imagining tech-
niques [14]. The results of behavioural observations and imaging
techniques are questioned, but along a number of different param-
eters. In some cases, there is a simple scepticism about how good
the scientific knowledge of the brain is, noting, for example, the
brain’s complexity or hidden nature in comparison with more
routine and overtly observable medical problems such as a
broken arm. It may be argued that, more fundamentally, the bio-
medical framework, within which most diagnostic tools are
framed, may make their results appear alien to the relatives’
experience, and indeed of only limited relevance in their struggle
to make sense of the situation, and to meaningfully go on in their
social practices.
At one pole, the supposed rigour of a scientific method appears,
to some family members, simply not to work, or to let them down.
Thus, it has been suggested earlier that the point of behavioural
tools is to systematize observational recording, yet relatives are
aware of inconsistencies between different observers. As one
father notes, ‘I do accept that it does come down to interpretation,
someone’s response or lack of response to a stimulus. It’s not the
same as finding out why an engine doesn’t work’. This effectively
summarizes the interviewee’s earlier comment:
I’ve never seen the details of how a SMART test is supposed
to be performed and interpreted. But this – if you’re going to
apply a scientific method to assessing someone’s condition,
the whole point of it is that it’s consistent and repeatable and
independent of the person who’s carrying out the tests. So
why are we getting different answers from different people?
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In contrast, some relatives may find the supposed objectivity of
tests problematic. They are thus wary of test results, suggesting
that such tests can be insensitive to the particular condition and
circumstances of the patient. Relatives suggest that a recent move-
ment between hospitals will have tired the patient and so made
them unresponsive; or they may currently be undergoing a drug
treatment that will suppress awareness or hamper its expression.
Others, although accepting the objectivity of tests, nonetheless
insisted that they cannot measure everything.
The objectivity and scientific status of tests was also seen as
something of a double-edged sword. Relatives note the danger of
being on the ‘wrong side’ of a test, which is to say that the test
gives results that frustrate one’s hopes and expectation. As one
relative notes:
Do you know, like I thought all these things [i.e. EEG] were
just benefits, and if you didn’t get the result you were looking
for then, so what? It doesn’t mean anything, do it again later.
But I didn’t realize how it could actually work against you.
The presupposed objectivity, and thus superiority, of scientific
evidence may be resented as trumping the observations, and even
intuitions, of the relatives. In the case of the relative just quoted,
she goes to significant lengths to document her own observations
of the patient, including recording videos of him, in an attempt to
resist the official medical interpretation that she fears is being
imposed upon him.
It may then be suggested that the supposed objectivity of the
scientific tests makes their results appear alien in the eyes of some
relatives and to the subjectivity and humanity of the patients.
While, as noted earlier, SMART tests do take into account the
relatives’ perspectives, and may be welcomed as such by relatives,
in some cases, the relatives’ responses to even SMART test results
may be understood as expressive of the relatives’ perception of the
results as being too coldly objective.
While tests might more or less successfully label patients, they
may do little, if anything, to help make sense of the particular
experience, and crucially, the ‘devastation’ felt by the relatives.
While ‘PVS’ or ‘MCS’ might have meaning as medical categories
– and indeed will have significant consequences for the therapies
to be prescribed (or not), and will have legal implications – they do
little to touch upon the complex social problem that is the CDoC.
Frameworks of interpretation
It may be suggested that, as frameworks through which the
patient’s condition are to be understood and constructed, diagnos-
tic tools typically fail to engage sufficiently with the experience of
relatives. This is, crucially, not to criticize medical professionals
who use such tools, who may and frequently do strive to achieve
that engagement. It is rather a recognition of the necessarily one-
sided and specialist interpretation that such tools make of the
patient’s condition. It may be suggested that, on the one hand,
medical categories fail to recognize the continuing significance of
the personality of the patient, and on the other hand, they fail to
recognize that the patient continues to be a social being, bound up
in the social relationships of relatives and friends.
The potential that tension may result between relatives and
physicians is frequently expressed vividly in the relatives’ stories.
A wife protests against the apparent reduction of her husband to ‘a
lump of meat’: ‘this is a person we’re talking about, not just a
thing. It’s not a lump of meat, you know, it’s a person who’s got a
future and has grandchildren and children and a wife that needs
them, you know.’ Another women recalls emphatically defending
the patient as ‘a man, he’s my partner, I’ve got a baby, he’s my
baby’s dad’, when the consultant in the intensive care unit report-
edly insisted that he ‘will not keep a slab of meat, that’s all he will
be, a slab of meat, alive in my room’. The continuation of the
patient as a person, with a future and with social ties, is thus
asserted, in part, against the threat of any form of medical reduc-
tionism (and in part because of a hope against hope of recovery –
as in the insistence on both the present tense ‘he’s my baby’s dad’
and the assertion that the patient is someone ‘who’s got a future’).
It should, of course, be pointed out that this consultant’s behav-
iour (as reported by the interviewee) was extreme, and by no
means all consultants were reported to show such insensitivity. Yet
the consultant’s point (if not the way it is expressed) may, in
medical and ethical terms, be defensible. If the patient has a poor
prognosis, then the attribution of personhood to them may seem to
be fanciful, and indeed an illusion of which the relatives need to be
disabused in the best interests of the patient. Relatives react dif-
ferently, and while some suggest that they would welcome such
honesty, others require the medical staff to continue to acknowl-
edge the patient’s (current and future) personhood. It may be
suggested that the continuing personhood remains important to
some relatives precisely as a way of coping with and moving on
with the crisis. It is, indeed, not an illusion, but a social reality
sustained through their interaction with the patient. If the patient
and their predicament can be understood through the category of
‘person’, with an attendant hope of recovery, then the situation
retains a vestige of everyday meaning, and the relatives can con-
tinue to act towards the patient – and interact with each other –
purposefully. Strict medical diagnoses and prognoses may strip
away this meaningfulness, leaving an incomprehensible void, or
leaving family members believing that the only reasonable
response would be to allow death, when often (once the patient has
stabilized) the only way of guaranteeing death is the withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration – an option considered totally
intolerable by many families [15].
The continuation of meaningful interaction, grounded in a sense
of continuing personhood (or at least allowing for that possibility),
may be seen when relatives strive to maintain the social life of the
patient. Relatives talk to the patient, as if the patient was aware and
a participant in a conversation. Further, relatives tend to the
patient’s appearance. For example, a patient’s facial hair is
plucked by relatives ‘because she would have been horrified to sit
there with hairs on her face . . . and she did have a lot of friends
still coming to see her’. Others ensure that the patient is not left in
bed all day, ensuring a form of socializing that goes beyond avoid-
ing medical problems such as lung infections, taking them to sit
in a common room or to ‘join’ a social event. Others take their
relatives out: ‘going outside and trying to present her, when we
were outside trying to dress her and present her in a way that was
consistent with her – with how she would have done anyway’. The
appearance or presentation of the patient, as the most basic
element of their interaction with others, and thus of their social
being, remains important as a focus for meaningful action and the
sustaining of their personhood.
The differences in ascription and construction of the patient’s
personality will have consequences for the way in which the
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relatives evaluate the condition and treatment of the patient. The
medical framework tends to focus on predicting and improving the
neurophysiological functioning of the patient. To gain functional-
ity is an improvement. Yet relatives may reject this reasoning,
questioning the ‘clearly defined hierarchy’ that doctors take for
granted. While a full recovery of consciousness may be desirable
in many cases, the transition from VS to MCS can be perceived as
placing an additional burden on the patient, precisely as they
acquire some awareness of their condition, as one interviewee
expressed it: ‘this vital, intelligent, sensitive man trapped in his
body and mind. Unable to communicate or move and visibly
distressed by this’.
More precisely, the formulation of what the patient ‘would have
wanted’ and/or appears currently to want will determine for the
relatives, very specifically, what is good or bad treatment for
this particular person. The healthy self, with full comprehension,
is imagined, and sometimes witnessed, to be experiencing and
judging the self as patient, who has no or very little awareness.
What counts as ‘a good prognosis’ is not then determined in the
abstract – in terms of a medically defined improvement in func-
tioning. Rather, the particular patient’s apparent horror at the
undignified condition that they are forced to endure, or conversely,
their apparent bravery and determination to recover, frames the
relative’s perception of what is a desirable outcome for this par-
ticular patient. Whether the ascription of these wants and judge-
ments to the patient is an accurate assessment (for relatives may be
projecting their own hopes and frustrations, as much as recon-
structing the patient’s pre-illness personality or current wishes)
may not be to the point.
Conclusion
It has been argued earlier that CDoCs typically pose a fundamental
challenge to lay people and medical professionals alike. Physical
movements are often the only clues – bare and often ambiguous as
they are – to the potential inner mental life of the patient, if any
exists. The interpretation of these movements as being expressive
or otherwise of the patient’s meaningful intentions has significant
consequences, not merely for the medical treatment of the patient,
but also potentially for their legal and social status. Earlier it was
suggested that behavioural diagnostic tools systematically refine
and simplify the observational competences that social agents use
in everyday life in order to recognize intentional behaviour,
thereby striving to make judgements based upon such
competences valid and reliable. If successful, they perform a vital
role in understanding the condition of the patient. Yet it was sug-
gested that, precisely in systematizing a lay social competence,
such tools were in danger of isolating the patient from richer social
relationships and abstracting away their particular personalities
(SMART tests, when used well, may be seen to be exemplary in
striving to avoid this, by including the perspectives of the patient’s
relatives, friends and carers). It was suggested that relatives may,
under some circumstances, nonetheless find the results of behav-
ioural and also brain imaging diagnostic tools problematic. It is
suggested that the reason for this tension lies in the different
interpretative needs of relatives and the medical profession, and
thus in drawing upon different interpretative frameworks.
Many relatives try to make sense of the crisis that has befallen
the patient by finding ways to include them in meaningful
social practices. In such circumstances, the patient is constituted,
through the actions of relatives and friends, as a continuing
person. It is precisely the particularity of this person, who is still
situated and sustained within meaningful social relationships, that
diagnostic tools may lose sight of. In their very systematization of
lay social competences, they may abstract away something of
the complex social context and personality within which the
patient’s actions and potential aspirations and needs have to be
interpreted. Medical professionals will, typically, be sensitive to
this problem, and strive to compensate. It may nonetheless be
suggested that it is important for the difference between inter-
pretative frameworks to be explicitly acknowledged, and their
complementary roles better understood. Only thus will the
hindering of the relatives’ capacity for making sense of their
situation be prevented. Positively, this also allows medical pro-
fessionals, lawyers and the relatives themselves to come to an
appropriately robust understanding of the patient’s social,
medical, legal and ethical status.
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